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A B S T R A C T
Objective: Anxiety and depression symptoms are common in patients with physical health conditions. In the
metacognitive model, beliefs about cognition (metacognitions) are a key factor in the development and main-
tenance of anxiety and depression. The current study evaluated if metacognitions predict anxiety and/or de-
pression symptoms and if differential or common patterns of relationships exist across cardiac and cancer pa-
tients.
Method: A secondary data analysis with 102 cardiac patients and 105 patients with breast or prostate cancer
were included. Participants were drawn from two studies, Wells et al. [1] and Cook et al. [2]. All patients
reported at least mild anxiety or depression symptoms. Patients completed the Metacognitions Questionnaire 30
(MCQ-30) and the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS). Hierarchical linear regressions evaluated
metacognitive predictors of anxiety and depression across the groups.
Results: The results of regression analyses controlling for a range of demographics and testing for effect of illness
type showed that uncontrollability and danger and positive beliefs were common and independent predictors of
anxiety in both groups. There was one positive bi-variate association between metacognitive beliefs (un-
controllability and danger) and depressive symptoms.
Conclusions: Findings support the metacognitive model, suggesting that a common set of metacognitive factors
contribute to psychological distress, particularly anxiety. Uncontrollability and danger metacognitions and
positive beliefs about worry appear to make independent contributions to anxiety irrespective of type of physical
illness. While metacognitive beliefs were not reliably associated with depressive symptoms this may be because
the current sample exhibited low depression scores.
1. Introduction
The World Health Organization (WHO) has defined four main non-
communicable diseases (NCDs): cardiovascular disease (CVD), type 2
diabetes mellitus (T2DM), cancer, and chronic respiratory disease,
which make the largest contribution to morbidity and mortality [3].
Cardiovascular disease and cancer have been associated with the
greatest disease burden of the four main non-communicable diseases
[3,4], including a large psychological burden. Anxiety and depression
symptoms are common in patients with physical health conditions
[5,6,7], and can reduce quality of life, increase healthcare use, and
delay time to return to employment [8,9].
In cardiovascular patients, 28% starting cardiac rehabilitation (CR)
report borderline or clinically significant levels of anxiety and 19%
report borderline or clinically significant levels of depression [10]. In
cancer patients, 50% experience depression, anxiety or both within a
year of diagnosis [11,12,13], which can be broken down into 30% with
depression and 20% with anxiety [14–17].
Despite increasing evidence of the high prevalence of anxiety and
depression in cancer and cardiac populations, the efficacy of current
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psychological interventions is limited. Whalley et al. [18] evaluated
psychological interventions for coronary heart disease and found only
small to moderate effects on improving symptoms of anxiety (d=0.25)
and depression (d= 0.21). This is in line with previous studies that
highlight the limited efficacy of psychological interventions in cardiac
patients [19–21]. Similarly, in cancer patients small to moderate effect
sizes are found [22–25]. For example, Jassim et al. [26] evaluated
psychological interventions in breast cancer patients and found a
standard mean difference of 0.28 between intervention and control
groups. There is a clear need for improved interventions for anxiety and
depression in these groups. One way forward might be by increasing
our understanding of the psychological processes linked to the severity
and persistence of anxiety and depression, which might aid in devel-
oping more effective interventions.
Models in health psychology have evaluated the role of illness
perceptions and coping as maintenance factors in distress. For example,
Leventhal's Common Sense Model of Self-regulation (CSM; [27]), pro-
poses that the beliefs individuals hold about their illness gives rise to
coping responses which influence health outcomes (i.e. anxiety and
depression). According to the CSM there are five illness perceptions that
impact on outcomes: identity (the illness and its symptoms), cause
(beliefs about the perceived cause of the illness), time-lines (beliefs
regarding how long the illness will last), consequences (beliefs about
the physical and social impact of the illness on oneself), and controll-
ability (beliefs about if the illness can be cured or managed). While
various studies have associated illness beliefs of the CSM to psycholo-
gical outcomes [28] the model does not explicitly conceptualize the
mechanisms linking these beliefs with psychological outcomes leading
to inconsistencies in the interpretation of the model. One model pre-
valent in the cancer literature is the fear of cancer recurrence (FCR)
model, whereby patients fear that cancer could return or progress [29].
The FCR model follows a cognitive-behavioural formulation, and was
influenced by Leventhal's Self-Regulation Model [27]. According to the
FCR model a patient's emotional reaction is due to their interpretations
of the threat of cancer which is triggered by their perception of cues
(i.e. physical symptoms) and their knowledge about cancer. This in-
fluences behavioural or emotional reactions, for example leading to
increased checking for signs of illness and reassurance seeking. Similar
to the CSM the FCR model is based on the cognitions or beliefs that the
individual holds about illness rather than the underlying processes that
link beliefs with psychological distress. For instance, it is often realistic
and common to believe that cancer might recur but some individuals
manage this fear better than others.
In contrast to models based on illness-related beliefs such as the
common-sense model, the metacognitive model of psychological dis-
tress views anxiety and depression resulting from difficult to control
repetitive negative thinking processes [30,31]. Such thinking consists of
anticipating threat (worry), ruminating about the past, and focusing
attention on danger and is viewed as a transdiagnostic cognitive at-
tentional syndrome (CAS). A core principle of the metacognitive model
is that this unhelpful thinking pattern is a result of underlying meta-
cognitive beliefs which perpetuate and strengthen negative thought
patterns and associated emotions [32]. Metacognitive beliefs have been
divided into two broad types; positive and negative metacognitive be-
liefs [32]. Positive metacognitive beliefs focus on the advantages of
repetitive negative thinking, for example: “Worrying helps me to avoid
problems in the future”, or “worrying helps me to get things sorted out
in my mind”. Whilst, negative metacognitive beliefs focus on the un-
controllability and danger of repetitive negative thinking, for example,
“My worrying is dangerous for me”, or “When I start worrying I cannot
stop.” In addition to these metacognitions a range of others have also
been identified: including beliefs concerning the need to control
thoughts, (i.e. I should be in control of my thoughts all of the time), lack
of cognitive confidence (i.e., my memory can mislead me at times), and
cognitive self-consciousness (i.e., I am constantly aware of my
thinking), which can potentially impact on behaviour and ability to
cope with stress-related cognitions.
Recently, research has begun to investigate the metacognitive
model in various physical illnesses such as; Parkinson's disease [33],
chronic fatigue [34,35], and cancer [2,36]. Allot et al. [33] found that
negative metacognitive beliefs of uncontrollability and danger, pre-
dicted emotional distress amongst patients with Parkinson's disease
independently of other disease related factors (e.g. medication, stage of
the illness). Cook et al. [2,36] found that negative metacognitive beliefs
were related to anxiety, depression and post-traumatic stress symptoms
in cancer patients and that these relationships were mediated by the
CAS.
Whilst there is increasing evidence that the metacognitive model
may be useful in explaining anxiety and depression in patients with
different physical illnesses, no study has evaluated the role of meta-
cognitive beliefs in cardiac patients. Furthermore, previous research has
focused on specific physical health conditions, and has not directly
evaluated if the same or specific metacognitive beliefs are associated
with anxiety and/or depression in different health populations.
Cardiovascular disease and cancer are serious life threatening illnesses
and two of the most common non-communicable disease which are
associated with a large psychological burden, however they involve
difference diseases processes and treatment trajectories, as such we
chose to evaluate these two physical illnesses as a means of exploring
possible common and more specific metacognitive correlates of anxiety
and depression across illness types. Furthermore, a comparison of re-
lationships between anxiety and metacognition in cardiac and cancer
groups is particularly informative for the testing of hypothesised
transdiagnostic relationships between these constructs because lay be-
liefs see worry as a cause of cardiac ill-health but it is not commonly
considered to cause cancer. Therefore demonstration of relationships
between metacognitions about worry and increased anxiety in both
groups as would be predicted by the metacognitive model would pro-
vide a robust test of the model. The identification of common or specific
factors has implications for targeting psychological interventions for
anxiety and depression in these groups.
Therefore, the present study had two main aims: (1) to evaluate if
metacognitions predict anxiety and/or depression controlling for so-
ciodemographic factors and (2) to evaluate if metacognitions predict
anxiety and/or depression differentially across two types of physical
illness, controlling for sociodemographic factors.
2. Method
2.1. Participants and procedure
2.1.1. Cardiac participants
Baseline data from cardiac patients (n=105) was drawn from the
PATHWAY trial [1] a multi-site randomised controlled trial funded by
the NIHR, UK and investigating the effectiveness of Metacognitive
Therapy (delivered in a group setting by cardiac rehabilitation practi-
tioners) in reducing anxiety and/or depression. Patients were heart
disease patients enrolled on a cardiac rehabilitation programme. They
met the following Department of Health [37] and/or British Association
for Cardiovascular Prevention and Rehabilitation CR [38] eligibility
criteria: acute coronary syndrome, revascularisation, stable heart
failure, stable angina, implantation of cardioverter defibrillators/car-
diac resynchronisation devices, heart valve repair/replacement, heart
transplantation and ventricular assist devices, adult congenital heart
disease, other atypical heart presentation). They were at least 18 years
old and were eligible for the current study if they scored 8 or more on
either the depression or anxiety subscale of the Hospital Anxiety and
Depression Scale [39]. The optimal cut-off score for the HADS is 8 for
the identification of symptoms of anxiety and/or depression, and is
appropriate for detecting anxiety and depression in cardiac populations
[40,41]. Participants were recruited from 5 National Health Services
(NHS) located in Manchester (UK): Central Manchester Foundation
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Trust, University Hospital South Manchester, East Cheshire, Pennine
Acute Trust and Stockport Trust. Patients were excluded if they met any
of the following criteria: (1) cognitive impairment which precluded
informed consent or ability to participate, (2) acute suicidality, (3)
active psychotic disorders (i.e. two [or more] of the following: delu-
sions, hallucinations, disorganized speech, grossly disorganized or
catatonic behaviour, negative symptoms), (4) drug/alcohol abuse
leading to clinically significant impairment or distress, (5) receiving
psychological support outside the care as usual, (6) having initiated
antidepressant or anxiolytic medications 8 weeks before starting the
study, (7) life expectancy of <12months. All participants provided
written and informed consent. The PATHWAY study was approved by
the National Health Services (NHS) North West Preston Research Ethics
Committee (Reference Number: 15/NW/0163).
2.1.2. Cancer participants
Baseline data from cancer patients (n=102) was drawn from a
cross-sectional study exploring metacognitive beliefs and processes as-
sociated with anxiety and depression in a cancer population [2]. The
sample used as part of Cook et al. [2] was used in the current study.
Participants were patients of at least 18 years of age, attending routine
pre-treatment clinics after receiving a diagnosis of primary non-meta-
static breast (n=81) or prostate cancer (n=24). Only data from pa-
tients who scored 8 or more on either the depression or anxiety subscale
of the HADS were drawn from the sample. The optimal cut-off for de-
tecting anxiety and depression on the HADS of 8 has also been found to
be appropriate for cancer patients [42]. Patients were excluded if they
met any of the following criteria: (1) recurrent or metastatic disease or
(2) considered by the clinical team or researcher to be too distressed or
confused to give informed consent. Cancer participants were recruited
from a National Health Service (NHS) teaching hospital located in the
North West of England. Participants provided written and informed
consent. This study was approved by the National Health Services
(NHS) North West 5 Research Ethics (Reference Number: 09/H1010/
70).
2.2. Measures
The following two measures, which were part of a questionnaire
battery for both studies ([1] and [2]) were extracted for purposes of the
present analysis:
2.2.1. Metacognitions questionnaire 30 (MCQ-30: Wells and Cartwright-
Hatton [43])
This scale assesses metacognitive beliefs across five subscales: (1)
positive metacognitive beliefs about worry (e.g., “worrying helps me to
avoid problems in the future”), (2) negative metacognitive beliefs
concerning uncontrollability and danger (e.g., “when I start worrying, I
cannot stop”) (3) cognitive confidence (e.g., “I do not trust my
memory”), (4) beliefs concerning the need for control (e.g., “not being
able to control my thoughts is a sign of weakness”), (5) cognitive self-
consciousness (e.g., “I am constantly aware of my thinking”). The MCQ-
30 has one positive belief subscale, while the remaining subscales
evaluate more negative metacognitive belief domains. Items are scored
on a 4-point likert scale ranging from 1 (Do not agree) to 4 (Agree very
much), with subscale scores ranging from 6 to 24, where higher scores
indicate higher levels of problematic metacognitive beliefs. The MCQ-
30 has shown excellent internal validity, convergent, and predictive
validity in clinical and non-clinical samples [43–45]. The Cronbach
Alpha's for the current samples are shown in Table 2.
2.2.2. Hospital anxiety and depression scale (HADS: Zigmond and Snaith
[39])
This is a 14-item self-report measure of symptoms of anxiety and
depression. Items are scored using a 4-point likert scale. Scores are then
summed to create two subscales (anxiety and depression), whereby
higher scores indicate greater levels of anxiety and/or depression. The
HADS has been shown to have good internal consistency and validated
in clinical and non-clinical samples [46,47]. The Cronbach Alpha's for
the current sample are presented in Table 2.
2.3. Data analysis plan
Less than 2% of the data were missing at the scale level, missing
scores for the MCQ-30 and HADS variables were imputed using the
SPSS Expectation–Maximisation algorithm [48]. The dataset was then
transferred to Stata v15 for further analysis.
Independent sample t-tests (for continuous variables) and Chi-
square tests (for categorical variables) were used to compare the clin-
ical groups with respect to demographic characteristics and psycholo-
gical measures. Bi-variate (Pearson) correlation analyses were con-
ducted to examine relationships between the psychological measures
within each clinical group. Hierarchical linear regressions were con-
ducted to evaluate whether metacognitions (MCQ-30) predicted anxiety
and depression (HADS) in physical illness (cancer or cardiac).
Sociodemographic factors (age, gender, education, employment status,
marital status) were entered as a group at step 1. Next, disease types
(cancer or cardiac) were entered at step 2, and at step 3 mean-centred
scores on all subscales of the MCQ-30 were entered. On the fourth and
final step interaction terms between disease group and each MCQ-30
subscale were entered to assess whether relationships between symp-
toms of anxiety and depression and metacognitive beliefs varied by
disease group. Variance inflation factors for the variables in the models
were all below 4.0, indicating low risk of multi-collinearity.
3. Results
Descriptives for sociodemographic and clinical information are
presented in Table 1. There was a significant difference between groups
in gender (p< .001). The cardiac group was predominately male
(64.7%) and the cancer group was predominately female (77.1%).
There was no significant difference between groups in age (p= .97),
with both groups having a mean age of approximately 60 years. How-
ever, groups differed significantly in marital status (p= .05) and
Table 1. Participant demographics.a, b
Cancer participants
(n=105)
Cardiac
participants
(n=102)
p
Age, mean (SD) 59.68 (9.15) 59.74 (10.58) .97a
Gender (N, %) <.001b
Male 24 (22.9%) 66 (64.7%)
Female 81 (77.1%) 36 (35.3%)
Marital status (N, %) .05b
Single 9 (8.57%) 21 (20.6%)
Married/living with
partner
67 (63.8%) 58 (56.9%)
Divorced/Separated/
Widowed
29 (27.6%) 23 (22.5%)
Employment status (N, %) .09b
Employed 46 (43.8%) 30 (29.4%)
Retired 38 (36.2%) 38 (37.3%)
Long-term sick leave 10 (9.52%) 18 (17.6%)
Unemployed/
Homemaker/Other
11 (10.5%) 16 (15.7%)
Level of education (N, %) .02b
No qualifications 36 (34.3%) 30 (29.4%)
CSE/O-level/GCSE/
Alevels
32 (30.5%) 16 (15.7%)
Certificate/diploma/
NVQ
24 (22.9%) 40 (39.2%)
Higher education 13 (12.4%) 15 (14.7%)
a t-test.
b Chi-Square test.
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education (p= .02), with cardiac patients more likely to be single and
less likely to have only school-level qualifications. The groups differed
significantly on only one metacognitive belief subscale: need for control
(t(205)=−2.11, p= .04), where cardiac patients had a greater belief
that they needed to control thoughts. Tumour grade for cancer patients
was classified as low, intermediate, and high [2]. There was no sig-
nificant difference between tumour grade category and symptoms of
anxiety, F(2,101)= 0.37, p= .69, or symptoms of depression, F
(2,101)= 0.87, p= .42.
Information on metacognitive beliefs and depression and anxiety
are presented in Table 2. There were no significant differences between
groups on symptoms of anxiety, t(205)= 0.35, p= .73. However, there
was a highly significant difference on symptoms of depression (t
(205)=−7.65, p< .001), highlighting that cardiac patients had
greater symptoms of depression in comparison to cancer patients.
Bi-variate (Pearson) correlations between study variables for the
cancer and cardiac samples are reported in Table 3. Correlations between
HADS anxiety and depression scores were at a low to moderate level for
both disease groups (r=0.383 for cancer participants, and r=0.149 for
cardiac participants). The MCQ-30 subscales mostly inter-correlated at a
low to moderate level, with two inter-correlations >0.5 for cancer par-
ticipants (positive beliefs about worry and negative beliefs about un-
controllability each with beliefs about need to control thoughts) and two
>0.5 for cardiac patients (negative beliefs about uncontrollability and
negative beliefs about need to control thoughts with cognitive self-con-
sciousness). Positive and negative metacognitive beliefs were positively
correlated with anxiety and depression scores within each group of pa-
tients, with negative beliefs showing a stronger relationship with anxiety
in the cardiac compared with the cancer group.
3.1. Metacognitive predictors of depression (Table 4)
Sociodemographic factors alone explained 16.3% of the variance in
depression scores (p< .001) and the inclusion of disease group ex-
plained a further 14.6% (p< .001). Age, gender and level of educa-
tional qualifications showed no associations with depression scores
(p> .05), but being retired or otherwise not working was associated
with mean scores between 2 and 3 points higher (p< .05). After con-
trolling for other demographics, being married or previously in a re-
lationship (divorced, separated or widowed) was associated with re-
ductions in mean depression scores of around 2 points (p< .05), but
this relationship became non-significant once disease group was added
to the model. Neither the addition of metacognitive beliefs (p= .11)
nor the interactions between beliefs and disease group (p= .88) made
any significant further improvement and added just 3.5% to the ex-
plained variance.
3.2. Metacognitive predictors of anxiety (Table 5)
In contrast to the result for depression, neither demographic factors
as a set (p= .09) nor the addition of disease group (p= .29) sig-
nificantly predicted participant anxiety scores, together explaining only
8.4% of variance; although mean anxiety scores were somewhat lower
amongst males (p< .01) at all steps in the analysis.
The inclusion of metacognitive beliefs at step 3 however resulted in
a model accounting for 38.2% of the variability in anxiety scores
(p< .001). Two of the individual metacognitive belief subscales de-
monstrated significant associations with increased symptoms of an-
xiety: positive metacognitive beliefs (B= 0.12, 95%CI 0.03–0.22;
p= .008), and negative metacognitive beliefs of uncontrollability and
danger (B=0.38, 95%CI 0.27–0.49; p< .001).
Adding the interaction terms between metacognitive beliefs and
disease group into the model resulted in a significant though small
improvement in model fit (R2 difference= 4.6%, p= .008), however
none of the individual interactions reached significance (p> .05 in all
cases). The evidence for interactions (i.e. disease group modifying the
Table 2. Summary of scores on psychological measures.a
Cancer participants (n=105) Cardiac participants (n=102) p
Mean (SD) Cronbach Alpha Mean (SD) Cronbach Alpha
MCQ-30
Pos 10.58 (4.44) 0.87 10.75(4.28) 0.87 .78a
Neg 12.86 (3.82) 0.87 13.35 (4.33) 0.80 .39a
CC 10.89 (4.55) 0.79 11.51 (4.85) 0.89 .34a
NC 10.35 (4.15) 0.86 11.45 (3.52) 0.68 .04a
CSC 14.22 (4.17) 0.78 14.64 (4.30) 0.80 .48a
Total 58.88 (14.53) 0.79 61.71 (14.60) 0.89 .16a
HADS
Anxiety 11.14 (2.77) 0.84 10.99 (3.17) 0.70 .73a
Depression 4.97 (3.46) 0.75 8.65 (3.44) 0.70 <.001a
MCQ-30=Metacognitions Questionnaire-30, Pos=Positive Metacognitive Beliefs, Neg=Negative Metacognitive Beliefs regarding Uncontrollability and Danger,
CC=Cognitive Confidence, NC=Need to Control, CSC=Cognitive Self-Consciousness, HADS=Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale.
a t-test.
Table 3. Correlation matrix for cancer (Ca; N=105) and cardiac patients (Cr; N=102), HADS scores and metacognitive beliefs.⁎, ⁎⁎
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Ca Cr Ca Cr Ca Cr Ca Cr Ca Cr Ca Cr Ca Cr
1. HADS Anxiety 0.38⁎⁎ .15 0.27⁎⁎ .35⁎⁎ 0.43⁎⁎ .66⁎⁎ −.03 .18 0.16 .46⁎⁎ .02 .47⁎⁎ .24⁎⁎ .61⁎⁎
2. HADS Depression – – .06 .01 .20⁎ .11 .07 .12 .19 .11 .01 −.04 .15 0.09
3. Positive beliefs about worry – – .38⁎⁎ .29⁎⁎ .22⁎ .18 .61⁎⁎ .36⁎⁎ .38⁎⁎ .30⁎⁎ .76⁎⁎ .62⁎⁎
4. Negative beliefs- uncontrollability and danger – – .22⁎ .23⁎ .53⁎⁎ .54⁎⁎ .34⁎⁎ .66⁎⁎ .70⁎⁎ .78⁎⁎
5. Cognitive Confidence – – .27⁎⁎ .36⁎⁎ .003 .09 .52⁎⁎ .57⁎⁎
6. Need to control thoughts – – .48⁎⁎ .49⁎⁎ .84⁎⁎ .77⁎⁎
7. Cognitive self-consciousness – – 0.63⁎⁎ .73⁎⁎
8. MCQ Total – –
⁎ p≤.5.
⁎⁎ p≤.001.
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relationship observed) is therefore equivocal.
4. Discussion
Identifying the common psychological factors that contribute to
anxiety and depression in the context of physical illness may support
the development of universal interventions. As such, this study aimed to
evaluate if metacognitive beliefs predicted anxiety and depression
across two physical illnesses (cardiac and cancer patients) when so-
ciodemographic factors were controlled for. In addition, the study
evaluated if metacognitive beliefs predicted anxiety and depression
differentially across the two physical illnesses, after controlling for so-
ciodemographic factors. Levels of anxiety were slightly lower in males
but unrelated to other demographic factors or type of physical illness.
However, anxiety was strongly associated with metacognitive beliefs, in
particular elevated positive metacognitive beliefs and negative beliefs
concerning the uncontrollability and danger of worry. In contrast, de-
pressive symptoms were not related to gender though they were sig-
nificantly higher amongst those not working and in cardiac partici-
pants, but were unrelated to any of the metacognitive belief subscales.
These contrasting patterns may be related to the generally higher levels
of anxiety than depression in both disease groups.
The result of adding interaction terms (MCQ subscales× group) to
the anxiety regression model showed a small increase in variance ex-
plained but none of the individual interactions were significant. These
data combined with the significant bi-variate relationships observed in
the individual illness groups suggest that two domains of metacognitive
beliefs: positive beliefs about worrying and negative beliefs concerning
the uncontrollability and danger of worry contribute to anxiety in both
cancer and cardiac patients. In these analyses we controlled for a range
of demographic factors and for gender balance that differed con-
siderably between illness groups. Since these were controlled for they
do not account for the relationships observed. However, a limitation of
the analysis is that the sample size implies that the power was low to
detect interactions, and stronger evidence of common and specific ef-
fects is needed.
The results are however in line with previous research demon-
strating positive relationships between anxiety and metacognitive be-
liefs in various physical illnesses including diabetes [49], cancer (Cook
et al., 2014) [2,36,50–52]), chronic fatigue [34,35] epilepsy [53],
multiple sclerosis [54], chronic pain [55,56], and Parkinsons disease
[33,57]. Such studies have noted that negative metacognitive beliefs
concerning the uncontrollability and danger of worry are a significant
predictor of anxiety and depression in these different illness types
[2,33,36,49,51–53,55,56]. Across mental health disorders also, this
particular metacognition domain appears to be transdiagnostic [58].
The findings support the metacognitive model [30,31] and extend
its reach by implying that under identical statistical control a common
set of metacognitive factors contribute to anxiety irrespective of phy-
sical illness type. This finding has potentially important clinical im-
plications as it supports the targeting of this common set of metacog-
nitive factors in the psychological treatment of anxiety across physical
illnesses Metacognitive therapy [32] is an effective treatment in mental
health settings (e.g. [59,60]) and is designed to target and modify these
dysfunctional metacognitions. Preliminary evaluation of metacognitive
therapy (MCT) for anxiety in physical illnesses has been undertaken in
adults and adolescents with cancer [61–63], with uncontrolled recovery
rates in distress in adult cancer survivors of 80% and 70% at post
treatment and 6-month follow-up respectively [61]. The efficacy of
metacognitive therapy in treating anxiety and depression symptoms in
Table 5. Metacognitive predictors of symptoms of anxiety.
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4
B 95% CI p B 95% CI p B 95% CI p B 95% CI p
Age −0.008 [−0.07, 0.05] .80 −0.009 [−0.07, 0.05] .78 −0.004 [−0.06, 0.05] .87 −0.001 [−0.05, 0.05] .96
Gender (male) −1.36 [−2.20,
−0.52]
.002 −1.58 [−2.52,
−0.63]
.001 −1.02 [−1.83,
−0.22]
.01 −1.01 [−1.81, −0.21] .01
No qualifications
CSE/O-level/GCSE / Alevels −0.46 [−1.63, 0.71] .44 −0.43 [−1.60, 0.74] .47 −0.70 [−1.69, 0.29] .16 −1.18 [−2.19, −0.17] .02
Certificate/diploma/NVQ −0.38 [−1.44, 0.67] .47 −0.49 [−1.57, 0.58] .37 −0.33 [−1.23, 0.57] .47 −0.66 [−1.56, 0.24] .15
Bachelors/masters degree −0.49 [−1.88, 0.90] .49 −0.53 [−1.92, 0.86] .45 −0.40 [−1.62, 0.82] .52 −0.57 [−1.78, 0.65] .36
Working
Retired 0.26 [−1.01, 1.53] .69 0.21 [−1.06, 1.48] .74 0.33 [−0.74, 1.39] .55 0.11 [−0.94, 1.16] .83
Long-term sick… 0.15 [−1.21, 1.50] .83 0.09 [−1.27, 1.45] .90 0.23 [−0.93, 1.39] .70 0.10 [−1.06, 1.26] .87
Unemployed/homemaker/
other
0.83 [−0.54, 2.21] .24 0.70 [−0.70, 2.10] .32 0.98 [−0.20, 2.17] .10 0.74 [−0.43, 1.91] .21
Single
Married…. −0.46 [−1.71, 0.80] .47 −0.34 [−1.61, 0.94] .60 0.12 [−0.97, 1.20] .83 0.18 [−0.90, 1.25] .75
Divorced/Separated/
widowed
−0.41 [−1.82, 1.00] .57 −0.30 [−1.73, 1.12] .68 0.11 [−1.11, 1.33] .86 −0.02 [−1.23, 1.19] .98
R-squared (R^2 difference; p-
value)
7.9% (7.9; 0.09)
Group 0.49 [−0.45, 1.44] .31 0.07 [−0.73, 0.87] .87 0.06 [−0.72, 0.84] .88
R-squared (R^2 difference; p-
value)
8.4% (0.5; 0.29)
Positive 0.12 [0.03, 0.22] .008 0.19 [0.05, 0.32] .007
Negative 0.38 [0.27, 0.49] < .001 0.34 [0.19, 0.48] < .001
CC −0.07 [−0.15, 0.01] .09 −0.14 [−0.25,-0.02] .02
NC −0.007 [−0.14, 0.12] .91 −0.07 [−0.24, 0.09] .40
CSC −0.04 [−0.14, 0.07] .48 −0.13 [−0.27,<0.01] .05
R-squared (R^2 difference; p-
value)
38.2% (29.8; <0.001)
Pos×Group −0.08 [−0.27, 0.10] .37
Neg×Group 0.03 [−0.19, 0.24] .81
CC×Group 0.11 [−0.05, 0.26] .18
NC×Group 0.19 [−0.05, 0.44] .12
CSC×Group 0.17 [−0.04, 0.37] .10
R-squared (R^2 difference; p-
value)
42.8% (4.6; 0.008)
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cardiac patients undergoing rehabilitation is currently being evaluated
in a large scale NIHR funded trial [1].
MCT may be a more appropriate psychological intervention for
anxiety and depression in physical illnesses than approaches such as
cognitive behavioural therapy as it does not require identifying
thoughts about disease, death, or disability and applying classic CBT
techniques such as reality testing. McPhillips et al [64] conducted a
qualitative analysis of emotional distress in cardiac patients and com-
pared how cognitive behavioural therapy and MCT models con-
ceptualize distress and why CBT may have limited benefit for cardiac
patients. They note that MCT was more parsimonious as it did not
distinguish between realistic and unrealistic thoughts but instead fo-
cused on perseverative negative thinking that was sufficient to under-
stand participants distress. Similarly, in cancer survivors the fear of
cancer recurrence (FCR) is common and realistic, with 60% of patients
experiencing debilitating FCR [65]. The reality testing of realistic
concerns about one's health may be an inappropriate approach. How-
ever, reducing and regulating the extent of the worry process, a target
of MCT might be more logical and effective.
The limitations of the current study are as follow: as the study is
cross-sectional, causality and temporality could not be evaluated so we
cannot discern if anxiety and depression precede or follow metacogni-
tive beliefs; therefore further studies are required to evaluate these
relationships. However, Nordahl et al. [66] provide preliminary evi-
dence for temporal relationships between metacognitive beliefs and
psychological vulnerability as they evaluated the association between
metacognitive beliefs and trait-anxiety using cross-sectional and long-
itudinal data-sets. They found that metacognitive beliefs accounted for
64% of the variance in propensity to depression and 83% of the var-
iance in propensity to anxiety. Furthermore, they also found that when
evaluating the temporal relationships between metacognitive beliefs
and psychological vulnerability, negative and positive metacognitive
beliefs prospectively predicted both domains.
A limitation of our study is that power to detect differential re-
lationships between metacognitions and symptoms of distress across
disease groups was low. Additionally, there is an imbalance in gender,
with females dominating the cancer group and males the cardiac par-
ticipants. This limits the generalizability of the findings. Groups also
significantly differed on levels of psychological distress, whereby car-
diac patients had greater symptoms of depression and overall symptoms
of distress. The cancer group only included patients with two types of
diagnosis; breast cancer or prostate cancer. This composition may have
accounted for the difference in distress between groups. For example,
Cook et al. [50] noted that women with breast cancer were more an-
xious than men with prostate cancer; therefore future studies should
include greater diversity in cancer diagnoses and ensure an improved
gender balance. Additionally, there was a difference in how patients
were sampled for the studies, while participants for both studies were
recruited from routine NHS clinics for their respective physical illness,
the cardiac sample were required to have a score of 8 or more on either
of the HADS subscales, while for the cancer sample only those with a
score of 8 or more on either of the HADS subscales were selected from
the original sample to be included in the current study.
Despite the limitations, the study provides preliminary evidence
that metacognitive beliefs are predictors of anxiety and these re-
lationships are common across cancer and cardiac illnesses. Therefore,
metacognitive therapy techniques developed for use in mental health
settings could potentially alleviate distress in cardiac and cancer pa-
tients. The results support the potential value of future research to
evaluate the effects of metacognitions on anxiety and depression in
patients with physical illnesses with particular attention to negative
beliefs about the uncontrollability and danger of worry and positive
beliefs about the advantages of worrying.
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